A system WF of subintuitionistic logic is introduced, weaker than Corsi's basic subintuitionistic system F. A derivation system with and without hypotheses is given in line with the authors' derivation system for F. A neighborhood semantics is introduced with a somewhat more complex definition than the neighborhood semantics for non-normal modal logics. Completeness is proved for WF with respect to this neighborhood semantics, and similarly for some logics between WF and F which characterize nice frame classes. The study by the authors of the conservativity of IPC over F with respect to some classes of implications is extended to WF, and shows clearly the difference in strength between the two logics. Study of translations of these weak subintuitionistic logics into non-normal modal logics turned out to be hard because of the difference between their respective neighborhood structures and leaves us with some open problems.
Introduction
Subintuitionistic logics were studied by Corsi in 1987 [2] , who introduced a basic system F and by Restall in 1994 [9] , who defined a similar system SJ, both with Kripke models in which no assumption of preservation is made and also not of reflexivity and transitivity. F cannot prove formulas like A → (B → A). Corsi showed that F can be translated into the modal logic K just as IPC into S4.
A much studied extension of F, Basic logic BPC, was introduced by Visser in 1981 [11] and shown in 2015 by K. Sano and M. Ma [10] to be translatable into the modal logic WK4.
Neighborhood structures are the standard semantic tool used to study non-normal modal logic. In a neighborhood model for modal logic, each state is associated with a collection of subsets of the universe and a modal formula ϕ is true at a state w if the set of all states in which ϕ is true is a neighborhood of w.
M. Moniri and F. Shirmohammadzadeh Maleki in 2015 [8] presented a neighborhood semantics for IPC and BPC. In this paper we will introduce a system WF, weaker than F, for which we define a neighborhood semantics. The neighborhood semantics needs to be more complex than the neighborhood semantics of modal logic.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the logic WF, it is created by replacing some axioms of F by rules. The derivation system for WF. with and without hypotheses, is modeled on the one for F of [5] . We prove a strong completeness theorem for WF. In Section 3 we prove strong completeness theorems for the logics between WF and F, formed by combinations of five axioms and rules. In Section 4, we show that WF has the finite model property. In Section 5 we study conservativity of IPC over WF with respect to the simple implications introduced in [5] . There is a clear difference in strength compared to the system F: IPC was proved to be conservative over F with respect to the much more complex basic implications [5] . In Section 6 we investigate the relation between WF and modal logic. The logic WF is clearly related to the non-normal modal logic EN. But because of the difference of the models we were able to prove only WF A ⇒ EN A. The other direction remains an open problem. A similar situation arises between the basic monotonic modal logic M and our system WFI R I L .
Soundness and Completeness
In this section we will introduce the logic WF, a logic strictly weaker than F and prove soundness and completeness of WF.
Definition 2.1 A pair F = W, g, NB is called a Neighborhood Frame of subintuitionistic logic if W is a non-empty set and NB is a neighborhood function from W into P ((P (W ))
2 ) such that
Here g is called omniscient (i.e. has the property 2).
We use the existence of omniscient worlds in the proofs of soundness and of characterization of properties of frames. In the following definition of neighborhood models we use the more standard neighborhood function.
Definition 2.5
An N-Neighborhood Frame is a triple F = W, g, N . N is a neighborhood function from W into 2 2 W , g ∈ W , and for each w ∈ W we have W ∈ N (w) and
W a valuation function on the set of propositional variables P . 
Indeed, we opted for N -neighborhood frames first but were not able to prove completeness for WF with respect to these frames.
Proof. The proof is straightforward by considering, for each w ∈ W ,
In the other direction the connection is not clear.
Definition 2.8
WF is the logic given by the following axioms and rules,
A B A∧B

A ∧ B → B
12.
A B→A
5.
A→B A→C A→B∧C
13.
A→B B→C A→C
6.
A→C B→C A∨B→C
14.
A↔B C↔D
The rules are to be applied in such a way that, if the formulas above the line are theorems of WF, then the formula below the line is a theorem as well. We return to the rules when we discuss deduction from hypotheses. We write for WF .
The logic WF misses the following axioms of F (Corsi's system [2] ):
Typical for intuitionistic logic is that often axioms and their corresponding rules are different in strength. That comes out nicely here.
First we will show that WF has the disjunction property.
Observation 2.15
The
is not valid in the class of all neighborhood frames.
Proof. Consider the neighborhood frame F = W, g, NB with
Observation 2.16
is not valid on the class of all neighborhood frames.
Also consider the valuation V (p) = {w}, V (r) = ∅ and V (q) = {g}. We have,
For the strong completeness theorem we will show that if Σ A then there exists a state ∆ in the canonical model such that ∆ Σ and ∆ A. For this purpose we need to have some definitions and propositions. Actually the definitions of theory and of derivation from hypotheses are identical to the ones for F in [5] .
Definition 2.18
A set of sentences ∆ is a theory if and only if where in the latter case the restriction is that A → B has to be provable in WF.
( 
Proof. The proof is easy.
Definition 2.23 A set of sentences ∆ is prime if and only if, if
Proof. By assumption and by definition of provability we conclude that D / ∈ Σ. Enumerate all formulas, with infinitely many repetitions: B 0 , B 1 , ... and define,
Take ∆ to be the union of all ∆ n . Clearly, ∆ D. We must show that ∆ is a prime theory. Assume that
Now if A → B and A ∈ ∆. Asuume B / ∈ ∆. Let B = B n , then, ∆ n , B n D and so ∆ n , A D, because from A → B and A we can derive B. But this is a contradiction, since A ∈ ∆.
Assume that F ∨ G ∈ ∆, and 
Thus by some steps and using some rules of WF we will have,
Again by Corollary 2.22 and (2.1) we have
Assuming that F , we want to show that F ∈ ∆. Let F = B n and F / ∈ ∆, so ∆ n , F D. From ∆ n we can derive F , so ∆ n D. But this is a contradiction, hence F ∈ ∆. So ∆ is a prime theory.
Since ∆ is a theory and ∆ D, D / ∈ ∆.
Definition 2.25
Let W WF be the set of all prime theories. Given a formula A, we define the set A as follows,
Lemma 2.26
Let C and D are formulas. Then
Proof. The proofs are easy. We only prove (c).
Then by the Weak Deduction Theorem C D. Let Σ = {C}, then by Theorem 2.24, there exist a prime theory Γ such that,
When constructing a canonical model the states of the world will be prime theories, i.e. elements of W WF . Consider the function NB WF :
In the completeness proof we need to be sure that, if ( A , B ) ∈ NB WF (Γ), then A → B ∈ Γ. This does not follow directly from the definition. It only follows directly that C, D exist such that C → D ∈ Γ, and C = A and D = B . In the following lemma we obtain what is needed to make the argument go through. Now we want to define the canonical model for WF.
Definition 2.28
The Canonical model M WF = W WF , g, NB WF , V of WF is defined by:
1. g is the set of theorems of WF, 2. For each Γ ∈ W and all formulas A and B,
By Theorem 2.11, WF has the disjunction property and therefore is a prime theory. (
Theorem 2.30
The logic WF is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of neighborhood frames.
Proof. Soundness is straightforward (in fact already shown in earlier lemmas 
Completeness for Logics between WF and F
In this section we consider some formulas which characterize special classes of frames. We form the logics axiomatized by some of these formulas and prove their completeness.
Definition 3.1
For every neighborhood frame F = W, g, NB , we list some relevant properties as follows. Here X, Y, Z are definable subsets of P (W ).
F is closed under intersection if and only if for all w ∈ W , if (X, Y ) ∈ NB(w), (X, Z) ∈ NB(w) then (X, Y ∩ Z) ∈ NB(w).
F is closed under union if and only if for all w ∈ W , if (X, Y ) ∈ NB(w), (Z, Y ) ∈ NB(w) then (X ∪ Z, Y ) ∈ NB(w).
F satisfies transitivity if and only if for all w ∈ W , if (X, Y ) ∈ NB(w), (Y, Z) ∈ NB(w) then (X, Z) ∈ NB(w).
F is closed under upset if and only if for all w ∈ W , if (X, Y ) ∈ NB(w) and Y ⊆ Z then (X, Z) ∈ NB(w).
F is closed under downset if and only if for all w ∈ W , if (X, Y ) ∈ NB(w) and Z ⊆ X then (Z, Y ) ∈ NB(w).
Lemma 3.2
The formula (p → q) ∧ (p → r) → (p → q ∧ r) characterizes the class of frames F = W, g, NB satisfying closure under intersection.
Proof. Let F be closed under intersection and M = W, g, NB, V be any model based on F . We have to prove for all w ∈ W ,
For this purpose it is sufficient to show that,
The frame is closed under intersection, so by (3.1) and (3.2), (
Hence, by definition of neighborhood frames for all
For the other direction, we use contraposition. Suppose that the class is not closed under intersection. Then there is a frame F and w ∈ F such that (X, Y ) ∈ NB(w) and (X, Z) ∈ NB(w) but (X, Y ∩ Z) / ∈ NB(w). Consider the valuation V such that,
V (p) = X, V (r) = Z and V (q) = Y . Then, (V (p), V (q)) ∈ NB(w) ⇒ w p → q, (V (p), V (r)) ∈ NB(w) ⇒ w p → r, (V (p), V (q ∧ r)) / ∈ NB(w) ⇒ w p → q ∧ r. So ((p → q) ∧ (p → r)) M (p → q ∧ r) M . Then by definition of neighborhood frames g (p → q) ∧ (p → r) → (p → q ∧ r). Therefore F (p → q) ∧ (p → r) → (p → q ∧ r).
Lemma 3.3
The formula (p → q) ∧ (r → q) → (p ∨ r → q) characterizes the class of frames F = W, g, NB satisfying closure under union.
Proof. Let F be closed under union and M = W, g, NB, V be any model based on F . We have to prove for all w ∈ W ,
The frame is closed under union, so by (3.3) and (3.
Hence by definition of neighborhood frames for all w ∈ W ,
For the other direction, we use contraposition. Suppose that the class is not closed under union. Then there is a frame F and w ∈ F such that (X, Y ) ∈ NB(w) and
It is very notable that, if we use N -neighborhoods instead of neighborhoods, the
characterize the same class of frames. This is clearly undesirable and strong evidence that our definition of neighborhood is the right one.
Lemma 3.4
The formula (p → q) ∧ (q → r) → (p → r) characterizes the class of frames F = W, g, NB satisfying transitivity.
Proof. Let F satisfy transitivity and M = W, g, NB, V be any model based on F . We have to prove for all w ∈ W ,
The frame satisfies transitivity, so by (3.5) and (3.6), (V (p), V (r)) ∈ NB(w). So, w p → r. Hence, by definition of neighborhood frames for all w ∈ W ,
For the other direction, we use contraposition. Suppose that the class does not satisfy transitivy. Then there is a frame F and w ∈ F such that (X, Y ) ∈ NB(w) and
Then by the definition of neighborhood frames Proof. Immediate by Lemma 3.7.
The logic F is the smallest set of formulas closed under instances of WF, C, D and I. Theorem 3.8 shows that F is sound and complete with respect neighborhood models closed under intersection and union, and satisfying transitivity. A rooted subintuitionistic Kripke model for F is a quadruple M = W, g, R, V with R lacking the properties of reflexivity, transitivity and preservation of rooted intuitionistic Kripke models [5] . The following theorem gives another proof of completeness for F with respect neighborhood models closed under intersection, union and satisfying transitivity, using the completeness of F with respect to Kripke models ( [2, 9, 5] ). Proof. Let M k = W, g, R, V be a rooted subintuitionistic kipke model and w ∈ W . For each w ∈ W , we define R(w) = {u ∈ W | wRu} and
We show that M n = W, g, NB, V is a neighborhood model closed under intersection and union, and satisfying transitivity. We know that R(g) = W , so
It is easy to show that with this definition NB is closed under intersection, union and satisfies transitivity. We only show that NB is closed under intersection. Let (X, Y ) and (X, Z) be in NB(w). We want to show that (X, Mn and so R(w)
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Now by the theorem just proved, a simple implication A → B can be replaced by a WF-and IPC-equivalent A → B such that A is a disjunction of conjunctions and B is a conjunction of disjunctions.
Lemma 5.4
For all p i , 1 ≤ i ≤ k and q j , 1 ≤ j ≤ m we have,
Proof. Easy. By the previous lemma we can conclude that to show that IPC is conservative over WF with respect to simple implications it is sufficient to do so for very simple implications. We can do so now for very simple implications, and in fact even for CPC instead of F. 
In [5] IPC was proved to be conservative over F with respect to basic implications, formulas of the form A → B with A and B conjunction/disjunctions of simple impli-
This shows a clear difference in strength between F and WF.
WF and Modal Logic
We consider the translation from L, the language of propositional logic, to L , the language of modal propositional logic. It is given by:
Proof. The proof is by induction on A. The atomic case holds by induction and the conjunction and disjunction cases are easy. We only check the implication case. So Also in this case we were not able to prove the converse.
Conclusion
In this article we constructed a neighborhood semantics for weak subintuitionistic logics extending a basic logic WF. It uses pairs of subsets of the set of worlds instead of just subsets. This definitely seems the right choice, especially in view of the results of Section 3 where the various obvious extensions of WF can be neatly separated by frame properties. And in that way it does become clear what the right logics to be studies in this area are. It does make the connection to non-normal modal logic less clear than one could hope for because of the different semantics, and this lead to some open problems, for example the relationship between WF and EN. The relationship between the models used in modal logic and subintuitionistic logic does need clearing up. The conservativity result in Section 5 makes clear what kind of implications can be expected to be provable in WF and separates WF from F, for which we obtained a conservativity result before. It is not clear how this relates to the complexity of the decision problem of the logics. This may be an object for further study. Finally, it seems worthwhile to study interpolation for WF and other logics.
